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Abstract 
Information deficits are considered an important source of why students from less-privileged 
families do not enroll in college, even when they are college-eligible and intend to go to 
college. In this paper, we examine whether correct and detailed information on the costs of 
and returns to higher education increases the likelihood of college applications of less-
privileged high school graduates who expressed college intentions in their junior high school 
year. We employ an experimental design with a randomly assigned 25-minute information 
treatment about funding opportunities for, and returns to, higher education given at Berlin 
schools awarding university entrance qualifications. Our analyses show that our information 
treatment indeed substantially increases the likelihood of treated less-privileged students to 
apply to college. Our study indicates that our low-cost provision of financial information not 
only increased their college knowledge but also substantially changed their college 
application behavior, despite other existing barriers, like economic constraints.
 
 
1.  Introduction 
In many countries, growing parental educational aspirations and changes in educational 
policies over the last decades have resulted in an increasing proportion of college-eligible 
students from less-privileged families. But enrollment in higher education continues to 
strongly differ by social background (Breen et al. 2009; Pfeffer 2008; Shavit and Blossfeld 
1993). Completing higher education, however, is important for getting access to higher 
occupational positions (Arum and Shavit 1995; Kerckhoff et al. 2001; Shavit and Müller 
2000). Moreover, earnings differentials between individuals with tertiary and upper secondary 
education degree are quite substantial.
1
 Thus, increasing the participation of less-privileged 
students in higher education could help reduce overall social inequality.  
 Studies show that less-privileged students, even when they are eligible for college and 
intend to go to college, are still less likely to apply to higher education than their peers from 
privileged families (see Engle 2007; Hanson 1994; Hossler et al. 1999; Hoxby and Turner 
2013; Khattab 2015; Schneider and Franke 2014; Schneider and Saw 2016). Lack of college 
intentions
2
 cannot explain their lower college application rates. Hence, the question remains 
what causes them to divert from their initial college plans. According to a rational choice 
perspective (Boudon 1974; Breen and Goldthorpe 1997), information on the costs of and 
returns to different educational pathways are important factors in educational decisions. 
Although this information is widely available via the internet, for families without college 
                                                          
1
 In the U.S., for instance, adults holding a tertiary education degree earn about 68 percent 
more than those holding an upper secondary education degree and in Germany 58 percent 
more (OECD 2016, p. 125). More meaningful for Germany is the comparison within the 
group of those holding a university entrance qualification (Abitur): those who graduated from 
research universities and universities of applied sciences still earn about 31 and 20 percent, 
respectively, more than those with completed vocational training (Glocker and Storck 2014, 
p. 119). 
2
 According to Hanson (1994, p. 159) educational intentions (or expectations) refer to “the 
education that individuals expect to achieve,” in contrast to educational aspirations, which 
refer to “the education that they hope to achieve.” 
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experience it is not easy to distinguish between reliable and unreliable sources of information 
(Hoxby and Turner 2013, p. 3). Thus, biased or missing information on the costs of and 
returns to higher education (hereafter: financial information deficits) might, at least partly, 
explain why less-privileged high school graduates with college intentions do not apply to 
college. Accordingly, policymakers in the U.S. and Germany, for example, believe that 
providing these students and their parents with information about college funding sources will 
increase their participation in higher education (BMBF 2010, p. 51; Scott-Clayton 2012). 
 In this paper, we investigate whether financial information deficits indeed reduce the 
likelihood of less-privileged high school graduates with college intentions to apply to college. 
Evidence for this explanation is still limited (for an overview, see Morgan 2010; Scott-
Clayton 2012). Research for the Anglo-Saxon context shows that high school students, 
especially from less-privileged families, lack information on available financial aid (e.g., 
Horn et al. 2003) and substantially underestimate the returns to and overestimate the costs of 
higher education (e.g., Betts 1996; Oreopoulos and Dunn 2013; Usher 2005; Volle and 
Frederico 1997). On the one hand, these deficits may be particularly important for less-
privileged students because they are often concerned about the financial costs of attending 
college (Morgan 2010, p. 212; see also Engle 2007; Erikson and Jonsson 1996; Hoxby and 
Turner 2013). On the other hand, even if they have comprehensive and correct information, 
lack of economic resources and parental support may be the major barriers preventing them 
from pursuing their college plans (e.g., Barone 2016). Yet, there is some evidence for the U.S. 
context that information deficits do matter (Berkner and Chavez 1997; Hoxby and Turner 
2013; Vargas 2004). The U.S. context, however, is characterized by high study costs and high 
returns to higher education—therefore, financial information might be an important source for 
application decisions. In contrast, a recent study on Italy, where costs of and returns to higher 
education are lower, finds that providing correct and unbiased information did not influence 
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students’ college intentions in their final high school year (Barone et al. 2016).
3
 They did not 
study students’ educational decisions, like applications. Hence, we still lack evidence on the 
impact of information on less-privileged students’ application behavior for countries with low 
costs of and lower returns to higher education, like Italy or Germany. 
 To fill this research gap, we conducted a panel study that included a field experiment 
in Berlin, Germany. We provided a randomized subsample of college-eligible students with 
research-based and uniform information on college-funding options and the returns to 
different postsecondary educational pathways. The information treatment consisted of a 25-
minute presentation and was conducted one year before graduation from university-
preparatory tracks; information on whether or not students applied to college was collected 
one year later.  
 We focus on students with college intentions
4
 one year before high school graduation 
for several reasons: First, we want to study the importance of information deficits for those 
who are “closest” to college application decisions in terms of eligibility and self-interest. 
Second, for this group, lower grades should reflect real differences in academic performance 
rather than anticipations of not enrolling in college. Third, at this advanced stage in their 
school career, students with college intentions may not have information deficits but rather 
lack financial resources or parental support. We therefore detect whether these students, too, 
have information deficits, and whether these deficits have any impact on their application 
decisions. 
                                                          
3
 Tuitions fees at Italian universities do not exceed €3,000 and the average earnings 
differential between upper secondary educated and tertiary educated workers is 42 percent 
(OECD 2016, p. 125). 
4
 College intentions are operationalized by the response “I intend to attend college” to the 
question “Based on everything you know now, what type of education will you probably 
pursue after school?” 
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Our study on college applications among less-privileged students with college 
intentions in Germany contributes to the literature in important ways. In contrast to most 
studies, we investigate the effects of information deficits on students’ application decisions 
instead of college intentions (a few weeks or months after the treatment).
5
 Although college 
intentions are positively correlated with actual decisions, not all students pursue their college 
plans; this is especially true for less-privileged students (e.g., Engle 2007; Hanson 1994; 
Sewell et al. 2004; Weiss and Steininger 2013). From a policy perspective, actual college 
enrollments are what matters in the end. We however deliberately choose to study college 
applications (as dependent variable), because they are a more straightforward measure of 
students’ decisions to pursue their college plans than actual enrollments: Applications refer 
exclusively to their self-interest and are not confounded with selection criteria and 
administrative processes of higher education institutions, which also influence the chances of 
admission and thereby of enrollment (but which are not changeable by our information 
treatment). Moreover, different U.S. studies show that lower enrollment rates of less-
privileged students are mainly caused by their application behavior rather than by admission 
decisions, and net of individual characteristics such as school performance (e.g., Hoxby and 
Avery 2013, p. 35f.; Koffman and Tienda 2008, p. 23). 
Moreover, previous experimental studies often paid little attention to students’ social 
background, although financial information deficits are assumed to be particular detrimental 
to college applications by less-privileged students. We therefore focus on less-privileged 
students. As indicator of social background we use parental education because it has the 
highest predictive power on children’s educational outcomes among the social background 
characteristics (Buis 2013; Bukodi and Goldthorpe 2013; Ermisch and Francesconi, 2001). 
                                                          
5
 Exceptions are the studies by Bettinger et al. (2012) and Hoxby and Turner (2013, 2015). In 
contrast to our study, they did not investigate information deficits on returns to higher 
education. 
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Students from less-privileged families are defined as those with neither parent holding a 
tertiary degree (non-college-educated parents).  
Thus, the specified research questions of our experimental study are: among college-
eligible and college-intending students with non-college-educated parents, do informed 
(treated) students apply more often to college than their uninformed (non-treated) peers? 
Moreover, is our low-cost intervention of providing additional and correct information able 
to increase their college application rate? Our results show that better information 
substantially increases the college application rate of less-privileged students with college 
intentions—indicating that the diversion from their initial college plans indeed results from 
information deficits about the costs of and returns to higher education. This finding for the 
German context supports the assumption that the information mechanism is universal: 
information deficits create barriers for less-privileged students to participate in higher 
education not only in countries with high study costs and returns, like the U.S., but also in 
countries with lower costs and returns, like Germany. 
 The paper is organized as follows: After presenting information on Germany’s tertiary 
education system, we present our theoretical considerations. We then describe the 
experimental design of our study, the data, variables, and methods used. Afterwards we 
present the findings of our field experiment, followed by a discussion of the strengths and 
limitations of our study and some concluding considerations. 
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2.  The German tertiary education system 
In Germany, enrollment in bachelor’s programs at research universities and universities of 
applied sciences requires a university entrance qualification: the Abitur or Fachabitur.
6
 
Hence, the first major barrier for less-privileged children to eventually enter college is still the 
transition after elementary school (Neugebauer et al. 2013): The Abitur can be obtained at the 
Gymnasium that starts in grade 5 in most German states and in grade 7 in Berlin and 
Brandenburg. But most German states have established additional university-preparatory 
tracks at comprehensive schools and/or at vocational schools (e.g., the so-called “vocational 
Gymnasium” in Berlin or Baden-Württemberg). In 2014, about 34 percent of university 
entrance qualifications were obtained at vocational schools (National Education Report 2016, 
table D7-5web). Obtaining a university entrance qualification is therefore less socially 
stratified today than it was in the past (Schindler 2015). 
 In 2013, school leavers who graduated with an Abitur (including the Fachabitur, also 
hereafter) accounted for about 52 percent of the same-age population (National Education 
Report 2016, p. 296), but the proportion of first-year enrollments in BA programs was only 
34 percent (National Education Report 2016, p. 277). One source of this discrepancy is that 
some students take one or more years off for internships, a voluntary social year, military 
service, travel, or work. Of those who obtained an Abitur in 2013, for instance, about 45 
percent enrolled in college immediately; another 22 percent enrolled one year later.  
 But even after several years, about 30 percent of eligible school leavers do not enter 
universities (National Education Report 2016, Table F2-7web). Most of them completed 
vocational education and training programs instead (National Education Report 2016, p. 105). 
                                                          
6
 In recent years, enrolling in universities as “non-traditional students” (i.e., without an Abitur 
but a regular vocational training degree and some years of related work experience) is 
formally possible but rarely occurs in practice. Non-traditional students account for about 3.5 
percent of all university students (National Education Report 2016, p. 128). 
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Some students work towards the Abitur primarily to have a competitive advantage in the high-
quality segment of the apprenticeship market
7
 (see Hillmert and Jacob 2003; Jacob and Solga 
2015; Powell and Solga 2011; Schindler and Lörz 2012). Yet vocational training attracts more 
less-privileged students—diverting them from higher education but providing a “safety net” 
in terms of low risks of unskilled work and unemployment (see Becker and Hecken 2009; 
Hillmert and Jacob 2003; Ishida et al. 1995; Mayer et al. 2007; Shavit and Müller 2000).  
This diversion phenomenon is indicated by the following figures: About 82 percent of 
those with at least one college-educated parent enrolled in bachelor’s programs in 2012—
compared to only about 61 percent of high school graduates with parents holding a vocational 
training degree, and only 70 percent of those with at least one parent holding a university of 
applied sciences degree, (National Education Report 2016, F2-5web). Parents holding 
university of applied sciences degrees often have prior training experience and/or are the first 
generation of upwardly mobile students in their family (Reimer and Pollak 2010). 
 These social differences in college attendance rates are surprising given that 
Germany’s tertiary education system is formally much less selective than it is in other 
countries. About half of all bachelor programs have open admissions policies (National 
Education Report 2016, p. 295). Enrollment in the other half is restricted by a so-called 
“numerus clausus,” that is, applicants have to surpass a certain grade average to gain 
admission (Herdin and Hachmeister 2014). This grade average depends on the supply-demand 
ratio of available slots in given fields and therefore sometimes includes even medium-
performing students. In addition, prestige differences between German universities are much 
smaller than in higher education systems with elite institutions, like that of the U.S.
8
 
                                                          
7
 They enroll, for instance, in financial service occupations (like bank or insurance clerks) or 
health occupations (like nurses and lab medical technicians) (Protsch and Solga 2016). 
8
 Difference in earnings and unemployment rates between graduates of research universities 
and universities of applied sciences are also small in the same field of study. 
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Moreover, higher education is tuition-free in Germany, and administrative fees are very low 
(less than €600 per year, including student tickets for public transportation).
9
 Lower-income 
students are eligible for federal means-tested financial aid, the 
Bundesausbildungsförderungsgesetz (BAföG), which is currently up to €670 per month 
(Destatis 2015a). In 2014, about 27 percent of students at the bachelor’s and master’s level 
received an average of about €450 per month of BAföG payments (Destatis 2015a, b).
10
 
 All in all, in Germany, administrative and financial barriers to higher education are 
rather low for college-eligible students and returns to tertiary education degrees are lower than 
in the U.S. but still substantial (see footnote 1). Nonetheless, a substantial share of high 
school graduates with non-college-educated parents does not apply to and enroll in tertiary 
education. In our study, we investigate now whether financial information deficits are one 
source of why they divert from tertiary education, albeit they intended to go to college. 
 
3.  Previous research and theoretical considerations 
Studies for the U.S. observe that the likelihood of school leavers with college intentions to 
enter college varies between about 50 percent (Schneider and Saw 2016) and 82 percent 
(Hossler et al. 1999), depending, among other things, on the definition and time point of 
measurement of educational aspiration and intentions, or on the samples analyzed (see also 
Engle 2007). Moreover, even high-performing low-income students who intend to earn a 
college degree do not always enter college (Hanson 1994; Hoxby and Turner 2013). In the 
UK too, even among the students with college aspirations, college intentions, and high school 
attainment only 68 percent apply to college at the age of 17–18 (Khattab 2015, p. 733; 
                                                          
9
 For more information, see http://www.bachelor-studium.net/studiengebuehren-kosten.php. 
10
 Half of that payment is a grant; the other half is an interest-free loan that has to be repaid 
later on a monthly basis. 
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analyses were not differentiated by social background). In Germany, high school graduates 
with non-college-educated and college-educated parents differ as well, both in the proportion 
of college intentions (72% vs. 83%) and in the proportion of college enrollment, immediately 
after school or planned in later years (66% vs. 80%) (Schneider and Franke 2014). 
 Why do not all students who expressed college intentions apply to college? The few 
existing qualitative and quantitative studies on this topic observe that information influences 
students’ college plans (see overview in Morgan 2010). However, they only capture the 
quantity, and sometimes the content, but not the quality of information available to students 
(and parents). Thus, students who respond that they “are (well) informed” can still differ in 
the degree of how biased and comprehensive their information is. Experimental studies are 
not confounded by such quality differences, because here variation in the content and quality 
of information is exogenous to individual feelings of “being informed.” Some recent 
experimental studies for the Anglo-Saxon context confirm the survey results and show that 
correct financial information is associated with a higher stability of college intentions (e.g., 
McGuigan et al. 2012; Oreopoulos and Dunn 2013). In contrast, for the Italian context, 
Barone et al. (2016) do not find an effect of unbiased information on students’ stability in 
college intentions.  
Most of the existing studies examine only how information deficits impact on 
students’ college intentions but not on their application behavior. When students answer 
questions about their educational expectations/intentions, “for some students, educational 
expectations may reflect their goals of achievement, while for others they may be a realistic 
assessment of their chances of being accepted, financing, and completing a four-year degree” 
(Goyette 2008, p. 477; Khattab 2015, p. 733). Thus, although college intentions close to the 
end of schooling are more serious than those expressed earlier in the educational career 
(Dumora 2004; Hanson 1994; Kerckhoff 1976), students may not be well informed when 
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answering the educational intention question. German data show that about 40 percent of 
college-intending students had not started their information search one year before graduation 
(Schneider and Franke 2014, p. 25, not differentiated by social background)—the time point 
of measuring college intentions in our study. Moreover, some students with non-college-
educated parents may not have anticipated all potential barriers (e.g., financial constraints, 
cultural reservations of their parents against college). However, especially at the application 
stage, less-privileged students often need to defend their college plans against their parents 
and these barriers (see Bourdieu 1984; Engle 2007; Horn et al. 2003). This could explain why 
college intentions do not always translate into college applications.  
Thus, the question remains whether providing additional and correct information can 
help increase the college application rate of students with non-college-educated parents. 
According to the rational choice approach (Breen and Goldthorpe 1997), educational 
decisions are not only influenced by economic resources and education-related information 
(as cultural resources), distributed within the family and via social networks (e.g., Davies and 
Guppy 1997; Erikson and Jonsson 1996; Stanton-Salazar and Dornbusch 1995), but also by 
the expected costs and benefits of higher education. Especially for students with non-college-
educated parents, major barriers to pursuing their initial college plans may be that they lack 
economic resources to bear the costs and, at the same time, that they overestimate the costs of 
and underestimate the returns to higher education.
11
  
 Research shows that all high school students substantially underestimate the future 
earnings premium of tertiary degrees (e.g., Usher 2005). This underestimation is largest, 
however, among less-privileged students (e.g., Betts 1996; Volle and Frederico 1997). 
                                                          
11
 Another barrier—not addressed by our (financial) information treatment—might be that 
students with non-college-educated parents have lower subjective success probabilities than 
students with college-educated parents with similar academic performance, because the latter 
have first-hand access to information about study requirements (Erikson and Jonsson 1996; 
Hossler et al. 1999).  
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Moreover, these students overestimate the costs of college attendance (e.g., Barone at al. 
2016; Grodsky and Jones 2007; Horn et al. 2003; Oreopoulos and Dunn 2013; Usher 2005). 
This underestimation of returns and overestimation of costs is particularly important for less-
privileged students because they are often concerned about the financial costs of attending 
college (e.g., Paulsen and St. John 2002; Volle and Frederico 1997). This concern also applies 
to Germany, although college costs are low (Lörz 2012; Schindler and Lörz 2012).  
Furthermore, students with non-college-educated parents have more information on 
careers that do not require a college degree (e.g., apprenticeships in Germany) than their peers 
with two-college-educated parents. At the same time, they are often unaware of their 
information deficits on higher education, not knowing, for instance, that they overestimate 
costs and underestimate returns to higher education, and therefore do not seek more 
information (Morgan 2010, p. 83; see also Horn and Nunez 2000; Menon et al. 2007; Perna 
2006; Slack et al. 2014). For example, although financial aid is available for lower-income 
students in many countries, these students are often not aware of its availability and/or 
regulations (e.g., Hossler and Stage 1992; Perna 2006; Hornet al. 2003).  
Studies for the U.S. show that access to detailed information on financial aid 
encourages low-income students (and their parents) to opt for college (see Beattie 2002; 
Berkner and Chavez 1997; Davies and Guppy 1997; Perna 2005; Vargas 2004). The question 
remains, however, whether correct and more information provided by disinterested third 
parties could indeed help increase the likelihood of college-eligible and college-intending 
students with non-college-educated parents to apply to college. Such information may not 
compensate for parental information deficits because of a lack of emotional ties and trust (see 
Slack et al. 2014). Evidence from randomized field experiments with impersonal information 
treatments suggests, however, that students do correct their expectations regarding the returns 
to, and costs of, higher education when they receive detailed information (Jensen 2010; 
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McGuigan et al. 2012; Oreopoulos and Dunn 2013; Wiswall and Zafar 2011a, b). But does 
such a correction have the potential of making students with non-college-educated parents 
indeed more likely to apply to college? Morgan (2002) argues that exposure to better 
information on higher education might not only lead these students to make better choices but 
also to be more confident in their particular choice. 
 Based on these theoretical considerations and our experimental study design, we 
expect to find support for the following hypothesis concerning the impact of financial 
information (i.e., of our information treatment) on the application decision of college-eligible 
and college-intending students with non-college-educated parents: Informed (treated) 
students are more likely to apply to college than uninformed (untreated) students.  
Though not the focus of our study, we also include privileged students. We 
differentiate between students with two parents holding a tertiary degree (two-college-
educated parents) and those with only one parent holding a tertiary degree (one-college-
educated parent). The situation of students with one-college-educated parent somewhat 
resembles the situation of those with non-college-educated parents: They have fewer 
economic resources than students with two-college-educated parents because of the existing 
earnings differentials by formal qualification presented in section 1 (see also section 5). Thus, 
having information on higher education costs may also increase their college applications. 
Moreover, in Germany, at least one of these students’ parents has information on the 
vocational education and training system, and some of the college-educated parents are first-
generation students who often hold double qualifications (first vocational training, then 
college, see section 2). They may therefore still misperceive the costs of and returns to higher 
education. We therefore also expect to find that informed students with one-college-educated 
parent are more likely to apply to college than their uninformed peers. 
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In contrast, biased expectations about the costs of and returns to higher education may 
have a smaller or no influence on the application decisions of students with two-college-
educated parents presumably because of parents’ status-maintenance motive, higher 
economic resources, and/or first-hand parental college information (Breen and Goldthorpe 
1997, p. 283; Erikson and Jonsson 1996; Lörz 2012; Reimer and Pollak 2010). Consequently, 
our information treatment may have no or only a small effect on their application behavior. 
 The effectiveness of the information treatment, however, may not only differ by 
parental education but also by students’ cognitive and noncognitive skills—for instance, 
grades, locus of control, and risk aversion. Students with lower grades lack more information 
(Hossler and Stage 1992, p. 447) and, at the same time, may need more (financial) 
information to increase their motivation to apply to college (Erikson and Jonsson 1996). 
Concerning internality-externality of locus of control as an important dimension of 
noncognitive skills (Rotter 1966), individuals with a higher extent of internality perceive their 
lives as being more contingent on their own behavior, whereas individuals with a higher 
extent of externality tend to attribute their lives to luck, fate, and chance (Maqsud 1983). 
Internality-externality of locus of control is an important determinant of attentiveness to 
information: Higher internality makes individuals more active in seeking information, 
whereas individuals with higher degrees of externality are more likely to be influenced by 
others, for instance, by information provided by third parties (Coleman and DeLeire 2003; 
Maqsud 1983; Rotter 1966; Seeman 1963). Given these considerations, students with lower 
grades and a higher degree of externality might therefore benefit more from additional 
information in terms of their college application decisions than students with higher grades 
and a lower degree of externality. Concerning risk aversion, Obermeier und Schneider (2015) 
show that higher risk aversion only affects the pro-college decisions of students from a lower 
 
15 
 
socio-economic background but not those of students from a higher socio-economic 
background.  
 These information-related mechanisms may particularly affect the educational 
decisions of less-privileged students because, on average, they have lower grades, higher 
degrees of externality in their perception of control, and higher levels of risk aversion than 
privileged students (e.g., Carton and Nowicki 1994; Jensen et al. 1990; Kelley 2008; 
Obermeier and Schneider 2015; Zwick and Green 2007). We therefore control for these 
differences. 
 Finally, in order to be more confident that our 25-minute face-to-face information 
treatment has indeed contributed to higher application rates—and not just to higher awareness 
of tertiary education among students as a result of having a face-to-face session in which 
college issues are discussed—we should find that treated students are indeed better informed 
about the specific issues that were discussed in the information treatment (i.e., knowledge on 
available financial aid and returns to higher education) than untreated students. 
 
4.  Data and methods 
We conducted an experimental panel study—called “Berliner-Studienberechtigten-Panel” 
(short: Best Up)—that includes a randomized information treatment. We first detail our study 
(sample and experimental design), then describe the dependent, independent, and control 
variables, and conclude with information on the statistical methods used in our empirical 
analyses. 
 
4.1 Data  
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Best Up is a panel study of Berlin students who attended 27 (of the 137) schools offering the 
possibility to obtain a university entrance qualification (Abitur or Fachabitur). Our sample 
covers the three major school types with university-preparatory tracks in Berlin: It consists of 
nine university-preparatory high schools (Gymnasium), nine comprehensive schools 
(integrierte Sekundarschule mit gymnasialer Oberstufe), and nine upper-level vocational high 
schools (berufliches Gymnasium).
12
  
 Our study focuses on students from less-privileged families. To obtain a sample with a 
meaningful number of observations for them, we first stratified Berlin’s schools of the 
abovementioned types using (1) school type; (2) share of population aged 25 and older with 
low education (according to the international classification of education ISCED 0-2) per sub-
district (ranging from 7% to 30% in Berlin); (3) cohort size one year prior to graduation; (4) 
share of students with migration background; and (5) share of female students as stratifying 
variables. Afterwards, potential schools were identified that are similar regarding the 
stratifying variables. Stratification was implemented using coarsened exact matching (CEM) 
(Iacus et al. 2009). To secure a high(er) number of less-privileged students in our sample, we 
restricted the sampling to sub-districts characterized by a relatively high share of less-
educated adults. It is important to note, however, that residential segregation in Berlin, and 
Germany in general, is comparatively low. Heavily deprived neighborhoods (e.g., ghettos or 
slums), as known in other countries, do not (yet) exist in Berlin. With our sampling, we 
exclude three sub-districts (Zehlendorf, Steglitz, Wilmersdorf) in which the vast majority of 
                                                          
12
 Berlin is one of the two German states in which elementary school ends after grade six. 
However, 33 out of the 89 Gymnasium schools are allowed to enroll excellent students 
starting in grade five. In these schools, students with non-college-educated parents are likely 
to be underrepresented. They are therefore not included in our study. So-called Berufskollegs 
(another school type offering the possibility to obtain a college entrance qualification) are also 
excluded, because they require a completed education and vocational training degree before 
enrollment. 
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students at the Gymnasium come from two-college-educated and wealthy families.
13
 One 
advantage of this sampling restriction is that the sampled schools are quite similar (in terms of 
different characteristics), meaning our comparison between students is less confounded by the 
potential influence of social differences in school quality or curriculum (e.g., Hossler and 
Stage 1992, p. 436) and school milieus and peers (e.g., Garg et al. 2002, p. 91)—all factors 
that might also cause school differences in the provision of information. Restrictions are, 
however, that we probably overestimate the treatment effect for the group of students with 
two-college-educated parents as we only consider those who do not attend segregated higher-
class schools, and that the sample size for students with two-college-educated parents is low, 
causing a potential problem of statistical power (see section 4.2 below). However, as our 
study focuses on less-privileged students, these restrictions are a minor concern. 
 Restricting our study to Berlin is another advantage. The city’s universities enroll a 
high number of students (about 160,000 in 2012-13). In addition, we know that physical 
proximity to universities affects participation rates (e.g., Hossler and Stage 1992, p. 435; 
Spieß and Wrohlich 2010). Berlin has four research universities and 27 universities of applied 
sciences, all of them easily accessible by public transportation. Thus, our respondents have 
good conditions to pursue their college intentions—which reduces the risk of a confounding 
impact of long distances to universities or unequal distances to vocational training and higher 
education institutions. On the other hand, Berlin is also a very attractive city, and thus 
competition to get into many programs might be quite intense. However, about 57 percent of 
                                                          
13
 Berlin is divided into 12 larger administrative districts and 23 sub-districts (12 in West 
Berlin and 11 in East Berlin) for about 4 million inhabitants. We conducted our study in West 
Berlin, including 9 of the 12 sub-districts. We excluded all East Berlin sub-districts (except 
for the vocational high schools, which are organized by occupational field rather than 
students’ residence) to avoid confounding our results by potential differences in educational 
decision-making by East and West Berliners. 
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the study programs in Berlin have open admissions policies (National Education Report 2016, 
p. 295).  
By excluding or reducing all of these confounding factors, our sample is ideal to test 
the causal impact of information on less-privileged students’ decisions to pursue their college 
intentions (i.e., to apply to college). The effect size, however, is not representative of college-
eligible school leavers in Berlin or in Germany. We therefore apply significance tests only for 
assessing the strength and the robustness of our estimates. 
At each school, we surveyed students who were at the end of their junior year in 
May/June 2013 (i.e., one year before graduation; panel wave 1). The realized sample size is 
1,578 (with a response rate of 60%). The students were re-interviewed three months after the 
initial survey, that is, at the beginning of the final school year (wave 2: August/September 
2013), and shortly after their graduation in June 2014 and right after the deadline for applying 
to admission-restricted college programs (wave 3: July-September 2014). In our analyses, we 
mainly use wave 1 (measuring students’ educational expectations) and wave 3 (measuring 
their application decisions). 
 Our analysis sample is a sub-sample of the total Best Up sample due to three 
restrictions. First, to answer our research questions, we only consider those students with 
college intentions in wave 1 (n=1,185, i.e., 75% of all participants in wave 1). We measured 
students’ post-high-school intentions by asking the question: “Based on everything you know 
now: What type of education will you probably pursue after leaving school? If you are 
planning to do a voluntary social year, an internship, or the like when you finish school, 
please choose the type of education you will probably pursue afterwards.”
14
 To answer this 
question, respondents could choose between different types of higher education institutions 
                                                          
14
 We took this question from the German National Education Panel Study (NEPS, 
A49_T_Panel_2012©NEPS; see Stocké et al. 2011).  
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and different types of training programs, or they could select “neither college/university nor 
training.” College intention is defined as students choosing higher education institutions. Our 
treatment and control groups do not differ in this respect: College intentions were expressed 
by 73 percent of all treated students who participated in wave 1 and 76 percent of our control 
group (p=0.455).  
 Second, we excluded 128 cases with missing information on major individual-
characteristic variables (college application, parental education, grade average, and locus of 
control), which leaves us with 627 students with non-college-educated parents and 430 peers 
with one- or two-college-educated parents. 
 Third, respondents had to participate at least in waves 1 and 3—otherwise college 
application decisions could not be detected. Thus, our final analysis sample consisted of 428 
students with non-college-educated parents—the focus of our study—and 292 peers with one- 
or two-college-educated parents, respectively (i.e., for both groups, 68% of all respondents 
with college intentions in wave 1 and valid information). Issues of selective panel attrition 
will be discussed together with our experimental randomization (see section 4.2). 
 
4.2  Experimental design 
We randomly assigned an information treatment to 9 schools—three schools per school type. 
However, because the treatment could not be carried out in one school, we treated only 8 
schools.
15
 The remaining 19 schools serve as our control group. The almost equal proportions 
of students who expressed college intentions at wave 1 (see above) is an indicator of 
successful randomization at the school level. 
                                                          
15
 The information treatment could not be conducted at one school, which was initially 
assigned as treatment school, owing to a miscommunication between the headmaster and the 
teaching staff. We therefore could only survey students in this school and assigned this school 
to the control group. 
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The treatment was conducted in a classroom setting, directly after students had 
completed the questionnaires in wave 1. It lasted for about 25 minutes and was given by 
researchers, who are perceived as credible authorities, thus enhancing students’ trust in the 
information provided (see Kolsto 2001; Morgan 2010; Slack et al. 2014). It consisted of a 20-
minute presentation on the earnings and unemployment risks of university graduates versus 
vocational training graduates for different fields of study and field-related apprenticeship 
programs, and information about funding opportunities to pay for college in Germany (e.g., 
BAföG, student loans, part-time work while studying, or merit-based scholarships/grants). The 
presentation was followed by a 3-minute film summarizing what was presented. Students 
were allowed to ask questions but did not use this opportunity very often.  
 As a baseline treatment, all respondents received a flyer with some general 
information on college attendance and a short list of websites on financial aid options (see 
appendix A). Thus, in line with the common approach in experimental research (see Box et al. 
1978, p. 205; Rubin 1974, p. 689), we compare a treatment group that attended the 
information session with a control group that was only given a list of resources. As the control 
students did not get the actual information, they had to have enough self-interest to search for 
additional information on their own. Given the widespread internet use among young people, 
this baseline treatment leveled out potential differences in knowledge about where to find 
relevant information. By contrast, our information treatment tests the impact of personally 
presenting (or providing) relevant information to less-privileged students, regardless of their 
awareness of lacking information. 
 We assigned the information treatment randomly to schools instead of individuals. 
This randomization strategy, common in the field of education, has several advantages: First, 
potential spill-over effects between treatment and control groups within schools are not an 
issue. Spill-over effects across schools (because students from treatment and control schools 
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might meet outside the schools) cannot be completely ruled out. They are unlikely to occur, 
however, because (a) our sample includes schools in nine different (larger) sub-districts, 
(b) Berlin is less centralized (i.e., each sub-district has its own downtown and at least about 
75,000 inhabitants), and (c) the highest number of selected schools within one sub-district is 
four. Second, because of the classroom setting, the experimental design has a rather high 
external validity compared to lab experiments. Third, this strategy also best simulates a 
potential policy measure. 
In our analyses, 127 students with non-college-educated parents belong to the 
treatment group and 301 students to the control group. The group with one-college-educated 
parent has 54 treatment and 110 control students, and the group with two-college-educated 
parents 30 and 98, respectively. Descriptive information for the treatment and control samples 
by parental education are documented in tables B1, B2, and B3 in appendix B. These tables 
reveal that randomizing schools does not automatically result in a perfect randomization of 
students. Within the group of students with non-college-educated parents, we find that the 
distribution of some characteristics (statistical or substantial) is favorable for treated students 
(i.e., higher figural cognitive competences, grade average, feeling of being informed about 
higher education, and a slightly lower level of risk aversion), whereas on average lower 
perceived parental educational aspirations are unfavorable for them. Moreover, the share of 
students with a migration background is slightly higher in the treatment group. Given that 
migrants and their parents have rather high educational aspirations (see Kristen et al. 2008), 
this higher share might potentially bias the treatment effect. Due to some panel attrition 
between waves 1 and 3, original differences between treatment and control group increased 
for figural cognitive competences, grade averages, migration background, and perceived 
parental educational aspirations; differences decreased for the feeling of being poorly 
informed about vocational training and higher education (see table B1 in appendix B). For 
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students with one- or two-college-educated parents, we also find increasing and decreasing 
differences between the treatment and control group (see appendix tables B2 and B3). 
Overall, the respondents who participated in waves 1 and 3 are a positively selective group 
compared to wave 1 (see appendix table B4). Thus, our estimates of the treatment effect seem 
to be rather conservative, because the effect displays the treatment-control difference between 
rather higher achieving and motivated students. 
To handle distributional differences (due to sample attrition, item-nonresponse, and 
issues of randomization) between the treatment and control group as well as parental 
education groups, we include control variables in our analysis (see section 4.4) and use a 
reweighting strategy (for more details, see section 4.5). 
 
4.3 Dependent and independent variables 
Our dependent variable measures whether students pursue their college intentions by actually 
applying to college immediately after graduation (wave 3). Although some school leavers 
decide to enter college later, the timing of entry into higher education is an additional 
dimension of social inequality, because “later entry into college results in foregone earnings” 
(Weiss and Steininger 2013, p. 190). Furthermore, some studies have shown that delaying 
enrollment in higher education reduces the likelihood that students will ever go to college 
(Engle 2007, p. 29). 
 Application decisions are measured as a dummy variable with 1 for application to 
college programs (called “college application”) and 0 for application to vocational education 
and training programs or neither training nor higher education (called “no college 
application”). Higher education refers to all tertiary educational opportunities, including 
research universities, universities of applied sciences, and dual study programs (i.e., study 
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programs in which bachelor’s programs are linked to firm-based training programs). By the 
time of wave 3, students had to have submitted applications to admissions-restricted 
bachelor’s programs if they wanted to start their programs in the fall following their 
graduation. About half of the programs at German universities have an open admission 
policy. They do not require applications, meaning that students interested in one of these free-
admission programs just enroll until the semester begins. Respondents enrolled in such 
programs (or with definite plans to do so) are assigned to the category “college application” 
(55 respondents). If respondents applied to both bachelor and vocational training programs, 
we classified them as “college application” (n=44). All other respondents are assigned to the 
category “no college application.” Based on this definition among the students with non-
college-educated parents, 291 respondents (68%) belong to the “college application” category 
and 137 respondents (32%) to “no college application” (in the total sample of 720 students: 
69% and 31%, respectively). 
Our main independent variable is participation in the information treatment, coded as 
1 for the treatment group and 0 for the control group. 
 As mentioned above (see section 3), we use parental education as our indicator of 
students’ social background. We define students from less-privileged families as those with 
neither parent holding a tertiary degree (non-college-educated parents)—the focus of our 
study.
16
 Moreover, we differentiate within the group of privileged students between those 
with only one parent holding a tertiary degree (one-college-educated parent) and those with 
both parents holding a tertiary degree (two-college-educated parents). 
                                                          
16
 We assigned the 33 respondents who provided information for one parent only to the group 
of non- or one-college-educated parent, respectively. If students did not report on their 
parents’ education, we use their parents’ responses. Parents’ response rate was too low 
(43.5%), to use the parents’ questionnaire for all respondents. 
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 To investigate whether our information treatment influenced students’ knowledge of 
the costs and benefits of higher education we look at two questions. First, in wave 3 we asked 
respondents for six facts about the federal means-tested financial aid BAföG (see section 2) 
that were partly covered in our information treatment. Second, we use one question 
concerning relative returns to tertiary degrees compared to completed vocational education 
and training, adopted from a Canadian study (see appendix in Oreopoulos and Dunn 2013): 
“Over a lifetime, do you think that a person with a tertiary degree would earn less or more 
compared to someone who completed vocational education and training?”, with possible 
responses ranging from 1, “the person with the tertiary degree would earn much less,” to 7, 
“much more”. We asked this question twice: in wave 1 (pre-treatment) and wave 3. 
 
4.4 Control variables 
As discussed in section 3, to account for any potential bias of the effect of our information 
treatment owing to differences in students’ cognitive and noncognitive skills, we control for 
these differences by including measurements conducted in wave 1. In our reweighting 
strategy (see section 4.2), we include the average of grade points on a scale from 15 (best) to 
0 (fail) in students’ two advanced courses in the fall/winter semester of their junior high 
school year. For locus of control, we used the 8-item measurement of the GSOEP Youth 
Questionnaire that contains two independent dimensions: internal and external locus of 
control (Weinhardt and Schupp 2011, pp. 30-37). An example of an external control item is 
“What a person achieves in life is above all a question of fate or luck.” We constructed a 
measure for externality of control by principal factor analysis, which revealed a 2-factor 
solution that replicates the two factors—internality and externality—in our data set. We then 
calculated the variable for externality of control by extracting rotated factor scores using the 
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regression method. Several studies using the same GSOEP items show that these items 
produced meaningful results (for examples, see Weinhardt and Schupp 2011, pp. 30-37). 
 We measured risk aversion with the question “How do you see yourself: Are you 
generally a risk-averse person, or willing to take risks?” (0 = I’m absolutely risk-averse to 10 
= I’m very willing to take risks) taken from the GSOEP Youth Questionnaire (Weinhardt and 
Schupp 2011, p. 62). For construct and external validity of this item, see the studies by 
Dohmen et al. (2011) and Obermeier and Schneider (2015). 
 To further reduce potential biases caused by distributional differences between the 
treatment and control group in other potentially decision-related factors, we also consider the 
following variables: feeling of being informed about higher education, figural cognitive 
competences, migration background, and parental educational aspirations. For definitions and 
descriptive statistics for all variables, see tables B1, B2, and B3 in appendix B.  
 
4.5 Methods 
With perfect randomization, we would only need t-tests for outcome differences between the 
treatment and the control group (without control variables). Yet as section 4.2 has revealed, 
the randomization of schools and some selectivity in panel attrition resulted in not perfectly 
randomized groups at the individual level. Moreover, we have discussed several variables that 
could intervene into how and why information matters. We therefore adjust distributional 
differences by using a reweighting strategy. Its basic idea is to address the question: What 
would be the treatment effect if there were no distributional differences between groups a and 
b? We therefore weight group b in such a way that it matches the distribution of several 
variables x of group a. For obtaining the weights that “balance” the two groups with respect 
to the set of variables x, we use entropy balancing (Hainmueller 2012). This technique 
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reweights our data so that means and higher moments of a variable are matched in the two 
groups. It is especially appropriate for our small sample because the issue of not covering 
“statistical twins” does not arise, and is more effective than parametric probit approaches. 
Significance tests (and standard errors) are adjusted in the reweighted analyses. 
Based on this technique, we reweight the control group of students with non-college-
educated parents according to the treatment group of students with non-college-educated 
parents. Thereby we remove all important observed confounders due to imperfect 
randomization. Moreover, as table B5 (appendix B) shows, even in this rather positively 
selective group of students, students with non-college-educated parents have lower means of 
grade-point averages and externality of control than their peers with one- or two-college-
educated parents.
17
 To ensure that the comparison by parental education is not biased by these 
and other differences, we also reweight the treatment and control groups of students with one- 
or two-college-educated parents according to the treatment group of students with non-
college-educated parents. 
Our reweighting does not address possible unobserved differences between the groups. 
Yet, in contrast to survey data, we have randomly assigned our treatment and control group, 
which already excludes some unobserved differences. In addition, as tables B 1-5 (appendix 
B) indicate, we have searched quite extensively for differences on observables (which are also 
sometimes proxies for unobservable characteristics), which are theoretically meaningful and 
are therefore included in our reweighting. The results of the reweighted analyses on several 
observable characteristics show that our findings are robust.  
                                                          
17
 Risk aversion among respondents with non-college-educated parents is lower (and not 
higher) than for their schoolmates with two-college-educated parents, as displayed in tables 
B1-3 (appendix B). One has to keep in mind that we only consider students with two-college-
educated parents who attended the same schools as students with non-college-educated 
parents.  
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To test for differences between the treatment and control group, we use one-tailed 
t-tests with standard errors clustered on the level of the schools. One-tailed tests are indicated 
because we assume that only positive or zero treatment effects are theoretically possible. 
 
5.  Results 
Table 1 reveals that even in our group of students with college intentions and in the German 
context of comparatively low costs of higher education, more than 40 percent of the students 
with non-college-educated parents are concerned about financing participation in higher 
education. Furthermore, about one third of students with one-college-educated parent are 
concerned about such difficulties, compared to only about 21 percent of their schoolmates 
with two-college-educated parents (keep in mind that we rather overestimate the concerns of 
the latter, see section 4.1). These two results suggest that information about financial aid 
might be important, especially for students with non- and one-college-educated parent. 
 
- Insert table 1 here - 
 
Table 2 shows that only 64.4 percent of the control (uninformed) students with non-college-
educated parents applied to college. Put differently, 35.6 percent of those college-eligible 
students with college intentions did not apply. This college intention-application gap is quite 
substantial. 
 Looking at the impact of our information treatment, we observe a remarkable 
difference between the treatment and the control group in the college application rates of 
students with non-college-educated parents (our treatment effect): The unadjusted college 
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application rate is about 11.9 percentage points higher for the treated than for the untreated.
18
 
The effect size is substantial: Our information workshop increased their application rate by 
18.4 percent (11.9/64.4*100) and reduced the intention-application gap by about one third 
(11.9/35.6*100=33.4). The remaining two thirds are caused by other reasons, most probably 
economic constraints (see e.g., Barone et al. 2016; Lörz 2012).  
 Table 2 also reports the adjusted treatment effect, using entropy balancing (see section 
4.5). The treatment effect remains stable in terms of significance and size, when controlled for 
differences between the treatment and the control group. These results strongly support our 
hypothesis: Informed students with non-college-educated parents are more likely to apply to 
college than their uninformed peers.
19
  
 
- Insert table 2 here - 
 
We now report the results for the two other groups. As expected, the (adjusted) treatment 
effect for students with one-college-educated parent is positive and significant: Our 
information treatment increased their likelihood of applying to college by 17.4 percentage 
points. In contrast, our information treatment did not increase the college application rate of 
their schoolmates with two-college-educated parents —even for this rather conservative 
                                                          
18
 Further analysis shows that the treatment effect is similar for male and female students 
(results available upon request). 
19
 Moreover, we modified the dependent variable to check whether the effect depends on the 
timing of college application. We additionally included those who did not apply to college 
directly after high school graduation but plan to do so after some other activity (except for 
vocational education and training) into the “college application” category. Even with this 
modified measurement, we find a substantial treatment effect of about 7 percentage points. 
 
29 
 
sample of students with two-college-educated parents.
20
 Yet one has to note that the sample 
size for their treatment group might not have sufficient statistical power.  
 We also regressed parental education on the likelihood of applying to college (using 
the reweighted sub-samples): Among the control students, students with two-college-educated 
parents were significantly more likely to apply than students with non- or one-college-
educated parent (b=.11, p-value=0.002, two-tailed test). In contrast, the effect of parental 
education was not significant for the treated students (which, again, might be due to the small 
sample size for treated students with two-college-educated parents). 
 Finally, we look for some indication of whether the treatment effect is related to topics 
discussed in the information session. Table 3 shows that respondents who participated in our 
information treatment indeed have more knowledge about BAföG (the financial aid option for 
students from lower-income families) than respondents in the control group: In the treatment 
group, about 16 percent of the students gave 5 to 6 correct answers, compared to only 
7 percent in the control group; in addition, the proportion of students with no or only one 
correct answer is slightly lower in the treatment than in the control group. Moreover, students 
from all parental education groups profited from attending the information session: the 
proportion of correct answers is considerably higher among the treated students from all 
groups. The largest knowledge gap between treated and control students, however, emerged 
for students with two-college-educated parents; yet they were also least knowledgeable 
without attending the presentation, presumably because they need this knowledge least, as 
most of them are not eligible for this means-tested financial aid. 
 
                                                          
20
 When we include those who did not immediately apply to college but reported future 
college intentions, we also find a substantial treatment effect only for students with one-
college-educated parent (of about 7 percentage points) but not for those with two-college-
educated parents. 
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- Insert table 3 here - 
 
Differentiated between the groups with and without college application, figure 1 reveals two 
interesting findings: First, within “college application” group, treated and control students 
differ remarkable and significantly in their knowledge about the means-tested financial aid 
option BAföG, whereas treated and control students without college application do not. This 
result indicates that applying to college (and, in doing so, maybe also applying for BAföG) is 
not sufficient for having better knowledge of BAföG. Second, the knowledge about this 
financial aid option differs quite substantially only within the treatment group: Those who 
applied to college had more knowledge than those who did not apply. Given that we measured 
this knowledge in wave 3 (i.e., after the application deadline), this difference seems to 
indicate that the additional knowledge about BAFöG acquired in our information session 
(treatment) increased treated students’ likelihood of applying to college, whereas those treated 
students who did not apply to college did not absorb additional knowledge compared to the 
control group. 
 
- Insert figure 1 here - 
 
Table 4 indicates that the information on returns to higher education has also somewhat 
influenced treated students’ assessment of the relative lifetime earnings of university 
graduates compared to vocational training graduates: In wave 1, treated students with non-
college-educated parents estimated the relative earnings to be much lower than they did in 
wave 3. In contrast, their untreated peers did not change their assessment in this time period. 
Treated students with one-college-educated parent, too, had some increase in their 
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assessment. Thus, earnings assessments of treated students with non- and one-college-
educated parent differ from those with two-college-educated parents in wave 1 but not in 
wave 3 (after the treatment). 
 
- Insert table 4 here - 
 
Finally, table 5 indicates the importance of studying the impact of information deficits on 
behavior and not only on expectations. Similar to what Barone et al. (2016) found for Italy, 
we find that the information treatment did not change the college plans between the end of the 
junior high school year (pre-treatment) and the beginning of senior year (2-3 months after 
treatment). The fact that we do not find a treatment effect on college intentions but a 
significant and substantial treatment effect on application behavior corroborates the idea that 
although college intentions are a good predictor of students’ application behavior, they do not 
measure actual behavior. Thus, information deficits can influence differently students’ 
intentions and actual behavior. 
 
- Insert table 5 here - 
 
6.  Discussion 
We examined whether financial information deficits contribute to prevent less-privileged high 
school graduates with college intentions to apply to college; and whether our low-cost 
intervention is a means to increase their application rates. The results of our experimental 
study indicate that information deficits indeed quite substantially keep them from pursuing 
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their college intentions—regardless of cognitive and noncognitive skills. We also find an 
increase in the college application rate for students with one-college-educated parent, who 
also expressed financial concerns regarding college attendance more often than students with 
two-college-educated parents.  
 Our analyses also provide insights into the sources of these information deficits. We 
corroborate the finding by Morgan (2010) that less-privileged students are often not aware 
that they are lacking important and correct information. In our study, all respondents received 
a flyer pointing out sources of information on financial aid options for higher education (see 
appendix A). Thus, our control students could have answered the questions about the federal 
means-tested financial aid option BAföG as well as the treated students if they had visited the 
webpages listed on the flyer. The differences between treated and control students therefore 
impressively show that person-to-person communication is indeed necessary to distribute 
important knowledge about higher education to students with non-college-educated parents 
(even to those with college intentions)—otherwise, they remain unaware of their information 
deficits. 
 Our experimental design has some limitations. First, we did not vary the type of 
additional information—we only provided financial information. Hence, we do not know 
whether, for instance, information on success rates in higher education, which is another 
determinant of educational decisions in the rational choice framework (see Barone et al. 
2016), would result in lower or higher shares of college applications than financial 
information, and whether this would also influence the college application rates of less-
privileged students.  
 Second, our sample is not representative of Berlin or Germany, but it resembles the 
situation in Germany quite well, as shown by similarities in the college application rates of 
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our control group immediately after graduation (see table 1) and the overall German 
enrollment rates (after some years of graduation), reported in section 2. 
 Third, the sample size for students with two-college-educated parents is small, and the 
sample does not include all groups of these students (see section 4). Our comparison between 
groups of parental education therefore only provides some indication that information deficits 
might not distract these privileged students from applying to college. 
 Fourth, the sample size of our experimental panel study also prevented us from 
differentiating between students with and without a migration background. The treatment 
effect might be smaller for migrant students because of their higher educational aspirations 
compared to non-migrants with the same socioeconomic status, on the one hand, and less 
information about the German vocational education and training system in their family and 
peer networks—and thus less “diverting” knowledge from higher education—on the other 
(Kristen et al. 2008). 
 Finally, as in most experimental studies, we can conclude that the relative size of the 
impact of information deficits on the total gap between intention and application is quite 
substantial, but our analyses do not provide insights into the factors that explain the remaining 
gap. 
 
7. Conclusions 
This is the first experimental and longitudinal study that investigates whether financial 
information deficits prevent less-privileged students with college intentions to apply to 
college in a country with low college costs. Internationally, it is one of the very few 
experimental studies that examine the effects of additional information on the costs of and 
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returns to higher education on students’ application behavior (Bettinger et al. 2012; Hoxby 
and Turner 2013, 2015).  
 Our results indicate that biased and lack of information on higher education among 
less-privileged students substantially contributes to their decisions to enroll in higher 
education, despite other barriers, such as financial constraints. Given the comparatively low 
costs of higher education in Germany, combined with substantial returns to tertiary degrees 
and the availability of an attractive educational alternative (Germany’s apprenticeship 
system), our study supports the idea that information deficits are a universal and substantial 
cause of why a considerable share of college-eligible students from less-privileged families 
do not pursue their initial plan to attend college.  
 This conclusion is further supported by the fact that the German school system is 
highly stratified. According to Mare (1980, 1981), less-privileged students eligible for college 
and intending to attend college are a rather “positively selected” group in terms of academic 
performance, learning motivation, and parental support. As all of these factors are known to 
increase the likelihood of college application, our substantial treatment effect for these 
students strengthens the assertion that financial information deficits influence their decision-
making at the end of high school. 
 We find similar results for students with one college-educated parent—a group that, 
like students with non-college-educated parents, is concerned about being able to finance their 
college plans. Our results for students with two college-educated parents seem to indicate that 
financial information deficits do not influence their college plans; however, future research 
has to corroborate this finding based on a larger sample size and a representative sample. 
 An important strength of our experimental study is that our findings are not 
confounded by differences in information quality and providers—confounders that typically 
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occur when having to rely on respondents’ answers to survey questions on information. 
Moreover, we could also show that information deficits on costs of and returns to higher 
education can be reduced by providing less-privileged students with more and correct 
information. 
 The treatment effect might be larger in countries with higher relative returns to tertiary 
degrees. It might be lower, however, in countries where the costs of higher education are so 
high that less-privileged students cannot bear these costs, regardless of proper information 
and large returns to tertiary degrees, and where financial aid options are not sufficient to 
remedy this lack of economic resources. Thus, future comparative research should investigate 
the impact of information deficits on higher education decisions in different educational 
systems. 
 Finally, our study has an important policy implication: It may take as little as a low-
cost information session in school to make a difference for college-eligible students from less-
privileged families, at least in higher education contexts like Germany’s: Face-to-face 
presentations of correct and detailed information (which may also raise student’s awareness of 
the need to research further information on their own) help increase the likelihood of less-
privileged students translating their college intentions into college applications—ultimately 
resulting in higher college enrollment rates. However, we have to qualify this statement: First, 
we focused on students with college intentions and provided our information treatment 
relatively late in their school career, one year before graduation from university-preparatory 
tracks. Further analyses on the development of college intentions between the junior and 
senior high school year show that at this late point, students without college intentions in 
junior year are rarely affected by the information treatment (Peter et al. 2016; Peter and 
Zambre 2016). So our treatment primarily serves to stabilize pre-existing college intentions. 
Second, the session was given by researchers (as disinterested and professional third parties), 
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an arrangement that is probably not feasible for a large-scale implementation. It would 
therefore be interesting for future research to investigate whether teachers trained for such an 
information session (as in Barone et al. 2016) would be able to achieve a similar impact. 
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Figure 1:  BAFöG knowledge by treatment (average number of correct answers, 
measured at wave 3) 
 
N = 637 instead of 720 (due to non-response to this question). 
Significance tests of treatment-control differences (p-value, one-tailed test): group of “college application” = 
0.006; “no college application” = 0.479; treatment group “college application vs. no college application” = 
0.027. 
Source: Best Up Study, analytical sample of all parental education groups (i.e., with college intentions in wave 1, 
no missing values in central variables, and participation in waves 1 and 3); own calculations. 
 
Table 1: Respondents’ assessment of the difficulties to finance college by parental 
education (in row percent, measured at wave 1)  
 Very/difficult Neither nor Rather/easy 
Non-college-educated parents 43.2 32.3 24.5 
One-college-educated parent 32.1 32.1 35.8 
Two-college-educated parents 21.4 33.3 45.2 
“During college, various things need to be paid for (e.g., travel, housing, books, or administrative fees). How 
difficult would it be for you and your family to pay for such costs?” (Source: NEPS: 
Q_A40_T_First_2012©NEPS. 
Source: Best Up Study, analytical sample (i.e., students with college intentions in wave 1, no missing values in 
central variables, and participation in waves 1 and 3); own calculations. 
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Table 2: College application decisions by treatment and parental education (measured 
in wave 3, post-treatment) 
 Treatment 
group 
(%) 
Control 
group 
(%) 
Unadjusted 
difference 
(treatment effect) 
(p-value) 
Adjusted difference 
(treatment effect) 
(p-value) 
Non-college-educated parents     
College application 76.4 64.4 11.9* 12.4** 
No college application 23.6 35.6 (0.014) (0.009) 
N 127 301 428 414 
One-college-educated parent     
College application 75.9 63.5 12.3 17.4* 
No college application 24.1 36.4 (0.084) (0.040) 
N 54 110 164 161 
Two-college-educated parents     
College application 66.7 74.5 -7.8 -11.2 
No college application 33.3 25.5 (0.822) (0.875) 
N 30 98 128 124 
Cluster corrected p-values: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, one-tailed test. 
Adjustments: grade point average, externality (locus of control), risk aversion, figural cognitive competencies, 
migration background, perceived parental college expectations, feeling of being informed about higher 
education, and differences between parental education groups (see section 5). 
Source: Best Up Study, analytical sample (i.e., students with college intentions in wave 1, no missing values in 
central variables, and participation in waves 1 and 3); own calculations. 
 
Table 3:  BAFöG knowledge by treatment and parental education (in percent of 
correct answers, measured at wave 3) 
Number of Treatment group Control group 
correct answers All Non-
college-
educated 
One-
college-
educated 
Two-
college-
educated 
All Non-
college-
educated 
One-
college-
educated 
Two-
college-
educated 
0-1 22.7 25.2 23.9 10.7 28.5 29.0 22.7 33.7 
2-4 61.6 61.3 63.1 60.7 64.4 63.0 73.3 58.4 
5-6 15.7 13.5 13.0 28.6 7.1 8.0 4.0 7.9 
N=637 (instead of 720 due to non-response to this question). 
p-value (one-tailed test): treatment vs. control group = 0.013;  
p-values (two-tailed test): differences between parental education groups within treatment group = 0.119; 
differences between parental education groups within control group = 0.749. 
Source: Best Up Study, analysis sample (i.e., students with college expectation in wave 1, no missing values in 
central variables, and participation in waves 1 and 3); own calculations. 
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Table 4: Respondents’ assessment of relative life time earnings of college/university 
graduates compared to those with completed vocation training by treatment 
and parental education (means of scale 1 = much less till 7 = much more)  
 Treatment group Control group Treatment effect 
(difference) 
Non-college-educated parents 
(n=381) 
   
Pre-treatment (wave 1) 4.88 4.78  
Post-treatment (wave 3) 5.14 4.88  
Difference within groups 0.26 0.1 0.16 (p = 0.118) 
One-college-educated parent 
(n=148) 
   
Pre-treatment (wave 1) 4.96 4.57  
Post-treatment (wave 3) 5.17 4.78  
Difference within groups 0.21 0.21 0.001 (p = 0.494) 
Two-college-educated parents 
(n=118) 
   
Pre-treatment (wave 1) 5.19 4.77  
Post-treatment (wave 3) 5.07 5.07  
Difference within groups -0.11 0.30 -0.41 (p = 0.078) 
Differences between non- and 
two-college-educated parents 
   
Pre-treatment (wave 1) 0.31 -0.01  
Post-treatment (wave 3) -0.07 0.19  
N=647 instead of 720 (due to non-response to this question), one-tailed test. 
Source: Best Up Study, analytical sample (i.e., students with college intentions in wave 1, no missing values in 
central variables, and participation in waves 1 and 3); own calculations. 
 
Table 5: College intentions measured in wave 2 (2-3 months after treatment) 
conditional on college intention in wave 1 (pre-treatment) by treatment and 
parental education  
 Treatment 
group 
(%) 
Control 
group 
(%) 
Unadjusted 
difference (treatment 
effect) (p-value) 
Adjusted difference 
(treatment effect) 
(p-value) 
Non-college-educated parents     
Stable college intention 88.9 87.5 1.5 4.8 
No college intention 11.0 12.5 (0.325) (0.062) 
N 109 256 365 355 
One-college-educated parent     
Stable college intention 93.5 93.6 -0.1 0.5 
No college intention 6.5 6.4 (0.507) (0.439) 
N 46 93 139 136 
Two-college-educated parents     
Stable college intention 89.7 94.4 -4.8 -4.7 
No college intention 10.3 5.6 (0.818) (0.817) 
N 29 90 119 115 
Cluster corrected p-values: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, one-tailed test. 
Adjustments: grade point average, externality (locus of control), risk aversion, figural cognitive competencies, 
migration background, perceived parental college expectations, feeling of being informed about higher 
education, and differences between parental education groups (see section 5). 
n = 606 (instead of 720 due to non-participation in wave 2), lower sample size for adjusted difference due to 
additional item non-response in control variables.  
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Source: Best Up Study, analytical sample (i.e., students with college intentions in wave 1, no missing values in 
central variables, and participation in waves 1 and 3); own calculations. 
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Appendix B: Descriptive information 
 
Appendix Table B1: Students with non-college-educated parents—descriptive 
information of treatment and control groups (pre-treatment, wave 1) 
Variables Treatment 
group (n=127) 
Control group 
(n=301) 
p-value N 
(428) 
Mean (std dev) of verbal cognitive competences
a)
 9.6 (2.83) 9.4 (2.94) 0.745 427 
Mean (std dev) of figural cognitive competences
a)
 11.3 (2.92) 10.5 (2.83) 0.061 425 
Mean (std dev) of risk aversion 5.6 (2.23) 5.8 (2.17) 0.212 425 
Mean (std dev) of grade averages, one year before 
graduation 
9.7 (2.07) 9.3 (2.16) 0.175 428 
Mean (std dev) of external locus of control 0.07 (1.02) 0.05 (0.99) 0.910 428 
Migration background     426 
No parent with migration background 38.9 %  45.3 %  0.683 (185) 
At least one parent with migration background 61.1 % 54.7 %   (241) 
Gender    428 
Female 60.6 %  58.5 %  0.728 (253) 
Male 39.4 %  41.5 %   (175) 
Educational expectations of friends    427 
Vocational education & training (VET) program 37.8 %  41.7 %  0.507 (173) 
College attendance 62.2 %  58.3 %   (254) 
Perceived parental educational aspirations 
(highest degree they would wish for their children) 
    
421 
VET degree 22.4 %  16.2 %  0.299 (76) 
College/university degree 77.6 %  83.8 %   (345) 
Presence and subjective assessment of usefulness of 
a school subject on “career guidance and vocational 
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orientation” 416 
Not offered 32.5 % 40.7 % 0.372 (159) 
Offered, not useful 24.4 % 24.2 % 0.531 (101) 
Offered, partly useful 19.5 % 20.1 % 0.354 (83) 
Offered, useful 23.6 % 15.0 % 0.191 (73) 
Self-reported level of information:     
How well do you [respondent] feel informed about 
VET system? 
    
411 
(Very) poorly informed 31.1 %  34.3 %  0.585 (137) 
Neither well nor poorly informed 38.7 %  36.3 %  0.455 (152) 
(Very) well informed 30.3 %  29.5 %  0.897 (122) 
How well do you [respondent] feel informed about 
higher education system? 
    
421 
(Very) poorly informed 22.4 % 33.3 %  0.045* (128) 
Neither well nor poorly informed 34.4 %  29.3 %  0.281 (129) 
(Very) well informed 43.2 % 37.3 % 0.281 (164) 
Cluster corrected p-values: * p < 0.05, two-tailed test; std dev = standard deviation 
a)
 So called Intelligence-Structure-Test IST
 
2000R (Amthauer et al. 2001). 
Source: Best Up Study, analytical sample of students with non-college-educated parents (i.e., with college 
intentions in wave 1, no missing values in central variables, and participation in waves 1 and 3); own 
calculations. 
 
Appendix Table B2: Students with one-college-educated parent—descriptive 
information of treatment and control groups (pre-treatment, wave 1) 
Variables Treatment 
group (n=54) 
Control group 
(n=110) 
p-value N 
(164) 
Mean (std dev) of verbal cognitive competences
a)
 10.1 (2.80) 9.7 (2.90) 0.551 164 
Mean (std dev) of figural cognitive competences
a)
 11.1 (2.41) 11.3 (2.81) 0.781 164 
Mean (std dev) of risk aversion 5.9 (2.42) 5.5 (2.11) 0.422 165 
Mean (std dev) of grade averages, one year before 
graduation 
9.3 (2.20) 9.4 (2.28) 
 
0.747 164 
Mean (std dev) of external locus of control 0.07 (1.06) -0.03 (1.06) 0.549 164 
Migration background     163 
No parent with migration background 46.3 %  56.9 %  0.424 (87) 
At least one parent with migration background 53.7 % 43.1 %   (76) 
Gender    164 
Female 59.3 %  63.6 %  0.576 (102) 
Male 40.7 %  36.4 %   (62) 
Educational expectations of friends    165 
Vocational education & training (VET) program 32.1 %  37.3 %  0.592 (58) 
College attendance 67.9 %  62.7 %   (105) 
Perceived parental educational aspirations  
(highest degree they would wish for their children) 
    
163 
VET degree 17.0 %  10.9 %  0.344 (21) 
College/university degree 83.0 %  89.1 %   (142) 
Presence and subjective assessment of usefulness of 
a school subject on “career guidance and vocational 
orientation” 
    
 
158 
Not offered 28.9 % 43.4 % 0.176 (61) 
Offered, not useful 19.2 % 28.3 % 0.033* (40) 
Offered, partly useful 23.1 % 17.0 % 0.806 (30) 
Offered, useful 28.9 % 11.3 % 0.024* (27) 
Self-reported level of information:     
 
50 
 
How well do you [respondent] feel informed about 
VET system? 
    
162 
(Very) poorly informed 27.8 %  33.3 %  0.508 (51) 
Neither well nor poorly informed 29.6 %  29.6 %  1.000 (48) 
(Very) well informed 42.6 %  37.0 %  0.492 (63) 
How well do you [respondent] feel informed about 
higher education system? 
    
164 
(Very) poorly informed 24.1 % 26.4 %  0.789 (42) 
Neither well nor poorly informed 29.6 %  33.6 %  0.535 (53) 
(Very) well informed 46.3 % 40.0 % 0.391 (69) 
Cluster corrected p-values: * p < 0.05, two-tailed test; std dev = standard deviation. 
a)
 So called Intelligence-Structure-Test IST
 
2000R (Amthauer et al. 2001). 
Source: Best Up Study, analytical sample of schoolmates with one-college-educated parent (i.e., with college 
intentions in wave 1, no missing values in central variables, and participation in waves 1 and 3); own 
calculations. 
 
Appendix Table B3: Students with two-college-educated parents—descriptive 
information of treatment and control groups (pre-treatment, wave 1) 
Variables Treatment 
group (n=30) 
Control group 
(n=98) 
p-value N 
(128) 
Mean (std dev) of verbal cognitive competences
a)
 11.3 (2.78) 11.3 (2.68) 0.998 128 
Mean (std dev) of figural cognitive competences
a)
 11.0 (2.28) 11.2 (2.86) 0.599 128 
Mean (std dev) of risk aversion 5.1 (1.63) 5.6 (2.41) 0.118 128 
Mean (std dev) of grade averages, one year before 
graduation 
10.4 (1.84) 10.5 (2.12) 0.838 128 
Mean (std dev) of external locus of control -0.07 (0.83) -0.24 (0.09) 0.290 128 
Migration background     127 
No parent with migration background 43.3 %  60.8 %  0.261 (72) 
At least one parent with migration background 56.7 % 39.2 %   (55) 
Gender    128 
Female 56.7 %  55.1 %  0.918 (57) 
Male 43.3 %  44.9 %   (71) 
Educational expectations of friends    127 
Vocational education & training (VET) program 36.7 %  30.9 %  0.451 (41) 
College attendance 63.3 %  69.1 %   (86) 
Perceived parental educational aspirations  
(highest degree they would wish for their children) 
    
125 
VET degree 16.7 %  12.6 %  0.472 (17) 
College/university degree 83.3 %  87.4 %   (108) 
Presence and subjective assessment of usefulness of 
a school subject on “career guidance and vocational 
orientation” 
    
 
121 
Not offered 42.9 % 48.4 % 0.556 (57) 
Offered, not useful 21.4 % 26.9 % 0.369 (31) 
Offered, partly useful 7.1%  13.9 % 0.131 (15) 
Offered, useful 28.6 % 10.8 % 0.013* (18) 
Self-reported level of information:     
How well do you [respondent] feel informed about 
VET system? 
    
126 
(Very) poorly informed 30.0 %  45.8 %  0.137 (53) 
Neither well nor poorly informed 36.7 %  30.2 %  0.531 (40) 
(Very) well informed 33.3 %  24.0 %  0.511 (33) 
How well do you [respondent] feel informed about     
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higher education system? 128 
(Very) poorly informed 26.7 % 30.6 %  0.582 (38) 
Neither well nor poorly informed 30.0 %  34.7 %  0.537 (43) 
(Very) well informed 43.3 % 34.7 % 0.443 (47) 
Cluster corrected p-values: * p < 0.05, two-tailed test; std dev = standard deviation. 
a)
 So called Intelligence-Structure-Test IST
 
2000R (Amthauer et al. 2001). 
Source: Best Up Study, analytical sample of schoolmates with two-college-educated parents (i.e., with college 
intentions in wave 1, no missing values in central variables, and participation in waves 1 and 3); own 
calculations. 
 
Appendix Table B4: Differences in characteristics of treatment and control groups 
between the total sample participating in wave 1 and the sub- 
sample participating in wave 1 and 3 (analytical sample), by 
parental education 
Variables Non-college-
educated 
parents 
One-college-
educated 
parent 
Two-college-
educated 
parents 
Mean (std dev) of verbal cognitive competences
a)
 -0.070 (+/+*) 0.250 (+/-) -0.382 (+/+) 
Mean (std dev) of figural cognitive competences
a)
 0.224 (+*/+) -0.087 (+/+) -0.089 (+/+) 
Mean (std dev) of risk aversion 0.070 (-/+) -0.122 (-*/-*) 0.466 (-*/-*) 
Mean (std dev) of grade averages, one year before 
graduation 
0.143 (+*/+*) -0.126 (+/-) -0.192 (+*/+*) 
Mean (std dev) of external locus of control 0.004 (-/-) -0.010 (-/+) 0.181 (+/-*) 
Migration background
b)
     
At least one parents with migration background 3.73 (-/-*) -7.84 (-/+) -2.67 (-/-) 
Gender
b)
     
Female 1.00 (-/+) 1.98 (+/+*) 0.88 (+/+) 
Educational expectations of friends
 b)
    
College attendance -0.16 (+/+*) 4.87 (+/+) -2.23 (+/+) 
Perceived parental educational aspirations
b)
 
(highest degree they would wish for their children) 
   
College/university degree 1.87 (-/-) 1.80 (+/+) 3.53 (-/+) 
Self-reported level of information
b)
:    
How well do you [respondent] feel informed about 
VET system? 
   
(Very) poorly informed -2.98 (+/-) 2.60 (-/+) .21 (-/-) 
Neither well nor poorly informed 0.58 (+/+) 2.95 (+/-) -0.59 (-/-) 
(Very) well informed -3.56 (-/+) -0.28 (-/+) 0.80 (+/+) 
How well do you [respondent] feel informed about 
higher education system?
b)
 
   
(Very) poorly informed -2.08 (+/-) 0.31 (+/+) 1.91 (-/-) 
Neither well nor poorly informed -3.50 (-/-) 1.83 (+/+) 4.66 (-/+) 
(Very) well informed 1.43 (+/+) 1.49 (-/-) 6.58 (+/-) 
N (participation in wave 1) 627 250 178 
N (participation in wave 1 and 3) 428 164 128 
Absolute differences = |treatment – control, total sample wave 1| - |treatment – control, analytical sample|; 
positive differences indicate larger treatment-control-group differences in our analytical sample than the total 
sample of wave 1; negative differences indicate smaller differences in analytical sample than total sample of 
wave 1. 
In parenthesis: + = participants in wave 3 showed higher values, - = participants in wave 3 showed lower values 
than non-participants in wave 3. First = treatment, second = control group.  
* p < 0.05, two-tailed test. 
a)
 So called Intelligence-Structure-Test IST
 
2000R (Amthauer et al. 2001). 
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b) 
In percentage points. 
Source: Best Up Study, sample of students with college intentions in wave 1, no missing values in central 
variables; own calculations. 
 
Appendix Table B5: Means of grade-point averages and externality of control by 
parental education 
 Non-college-
educated 
parents 
 
Diff. 
One-college-
educated 
parent 
 
Diff. 
Two-college-
educated 
parents 
Mean grade averages  9.39 
(.169) 
-1.10** 
(.196) 
9.39 
(.258) 
-1.11** 
(.296) 
10.50 
(.201) 
Mean of locus of 
control  
0.06 
(.059) 
0.26* 
(.086) 
-0.003 
(.073) 
0.21 
(.106) 
-0.20 
(.060) 
Measured at wave 1 (one year before graduation). N = 720. 
Cluster corrected standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.001, two-tailed test. 
Diff. = Difference to students with two-college-educated parents. 
Source: Best Up Study, analytical sample (i.e., students with college intentions in wave 1, no missing values in 
central variables, and participation in waves 1 and 3); own calculations. 
 
 
 
